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1. Introduction
In analyses of income inequality it is common practice to examine the contribution
from various income components to overall income inequality by using decomposable
measures of inequality. One popular approach is to use the Gini coefficient for measuring
overall inequality and to use the related decomposition method to assess the contribution to
inequality in the distribution of disposable income from various income components, such as,
market income, public transfers and tax.
To motivate why it is of interest to decompose overall inequality by income
components consider the following apparently simple question: Is the contribution to overall
inequality from an equal-sized transfer to each income receiving unit equalizing or neutral?
The answer to this question depends on how the term "equalizing/neutral contribution" is
perceived. The standard approach compares the Gini coefficient with and without the transfer
payment and is thus solely concerned with the consequences for overall inequality from
introducing the transfer payment. Based on this approach, the income component in question
is defined as equalizing if its inclusion in total income reduces inequality. However, it seems
likely that changes in the level of one income component or introduction of a new income
component lead to behavioral responses (indirect effects) so that the other income components
may adjust simultaneously. Most studies, however, restrict their scope to the direct effects and
even refer to them as overall effects. Motivated by this practice it may seem uncontroversial
to evaluate the distributional impact of any income component by comparing inequality with
and without the income component in question. In many cases, however, this approach may
lead to confusing results (see Horvath (1980), Danziger (1980) and Betson and van der Gaag
(1984)). For example, in assessing the contribution from wife's income to family income
inequality we found, based on Norwegian data, that adding wife's income to husbands's
income decreased inequality. By contrast, adding husband's income to wife's income also
decreased inequality. Thus, this approach yields results that depend on the ordering of income
components (see Lerman and Yitzaki (1985)) and moreover, presupposes that wife's
(husbands's) labor supply decisions are made conditional on husband's (wife's) earnings.
Empirical analyses of labour supply show, however, that husband's and wife's decisions
concerning hours of work are made simultaneously, which suggests that these two income
components should be treated symmetrically. Thus, decomposing family income inequality
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with respect to the contributions from wife's and husband's incomes appears to be a more
relevant approach than the (conditional) stepwise method when the objective is to compare
the contribution of different income components to overall inequality. As noted the
decomposition method provides a description of the contributions to inequality in family
income from wife's and husband's earnings which acknowledges the simultaneous aspects of
economic behavior. In contrast, the conventional stepwise method requires a hypothetical
assumption of how family income would have changed without wife's income, respectively
without husband's income. A similar critique can be raised against the widespread method of
assessing the contribution of transfer payments to income inequality as the reduction/increase
in inequality following from adding transfer payments to market income. However, even
though we question the practice of using the stepwise method as basis for judging the
distributional impact of an income component, we realize that comparing inequality with and
without certain income components may be relevant and of interest for other reasons.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss various types of applications and interpretations
of the decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income components. Our objective is to
clarify what is meant by an equalizing/disequalizing contribution to inequality, and distinguish
this from an equalizing/disequalizing effect on inequality. Within the decomposition
framework we will argue that it appears appropriate to use the term contribution to inequality
when describing income distribution per se, while the term effect on inequality should be
reserved for cases that concern interventions in income distribution, be it a change in the level
of an income component, a new policy proposal or alternatively, the introduction of a new
income component.
The outline of the paper is the following: In Section 2 we discuss the standard
application and interpretation of the decomposition of the Gini coefficient. Note, however, that
this practice, see Kakwani (1977, 1980), has recently been criticized by Podder (1993) who
states that this approach is faulty and yields misleading results. We question Podder's
approach and emphasize the distinction between contributions to inequality and marginal
effect on inquality from changes in a single income component. Section 3 deals with the
introduction of a new income component, and demonstrates the importance of comparing the
decompositions of the Gini coefficients with and without the new income component, in
contrast to merely comparing the level of the Gini coefficient with and without the new
income component. In Section 4 we apply this framework to analyze the impact of allowing
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measured income to include the value of unpaid household work, illustrated by Norwegian
time use data. In Section 5 we discuss the practice of evaluating the distributional impact of
an income component by comparing inequality with and without the income component, and
moreover seek to clarify the notion of overall distributive effect
2. Inequality contributions versus marginal effects by income components
The purpose of inequality decompositions is to provide a description of each income
component's contribution to overall inequality. Moreover, as distinct from the conventional
stepwise approach the decomposition method provides important information about the
process caused by the actual intervention in the income distribution, i.e. the process by which
the preintervention distribution is mapped into the postintervention distribution. The
intervention may, for instance, alter the ranking of units (individuals/households) within the
distribution of total income and thus the interaction between each of the income components
and total income, which concerns the fairness of the redistributive process. Decision makers
may consider this type of information equally important as information about the magnitude
of change in overall inequality due to the direct effect from the intervention.
There seems, however, to be controversies about application and interpretation of
inequality decompositions. In this section we address Fodder's critique of the standard use
of the decomposition of the Gini coefficient. Note, however, that the conclusions reached are
valid for the "natural" decomposition of any measure of inequality, provided that the
contribution of an equally distributed income component to overall inequality is zero (see
Shorrocks (1982)).
Assume that total income X is the sum of s income components
(1) X = E X.
Let G be the Gini coefficient of the distribution of total income. As demonstrated by Rao
(1969) and Kakwani (1977, 1980), G admits the following decomposition
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(2)	 G =
i=1
where piat is the ratio between the means of Xi and X, and yi is the conditional Gini
coefficient of component i given the units' rank order in X and provides information about
the interaction between component i and total income. Note that pi/p is equal to the income
share of Xi .
We call y the concentration coefficient which is in accordance with Mahalanobis
(1960). If every unit receives an equal amount of component i then the corresponding
concentration coefficient (yi) is equal to zero which suggests that component i's contribution
to overall inequality is neutral rather than equalizing. Podder (1993) claims that this
interpretation is not valid since "we know that an addition of a constant to all incomes
decreases total inequality" (p. 53). Thus, it seems that Podder ignores the simultaneous aspects
in judging the components' contributions to overall inequality and consequently deals with
the income components in an asymmetric manner. By contrast, the decomposition (2) allows
a symmetric treatment of the various income components' contributions to overall inequality,
where
—T i
Pl
accounts for the contribution to inequality of component i. In order to avoid incorrect
interpretations it is essential to observe that the sign of yi solely shows whether or not
component i has contributed positively or negatively to overall inequality, but is silent about
how a marginal increase in component
 i
 will affect overall inequality. This is a different
question which can be answered by deriving the elasticity of the Gini coefficient (G) with
respect to the mean (pi) of component i, provided that the remaining income components are
kept fixed. The elasticity is established by straightforward differentiation, given unchanged
concentration coefficients,
(
(3)
	
a logG
	 Yi _ 1
D log pi
The elasticity (3) demonstrates that a small increase in component i will decrease overall
inequality if the corresponding concentration coefficient is lower than the overall inequality.
In his critique of the conventional usage of the decomposition (2) Podder (1993)
suggests that the interpretation of (2) ought to be made in terms of the marginal effects (3).
This approach, however, suffers from several shortcomings. Firstly, the elasticity (3) is not
really concerned with which income component has contributed to what in overall inequality,
but rather with what would happen when one component at a time increases, given that the
remaining components are kept fixed. Secondly, the sum of the marginal effects is by
definition equal to zero, while the purpose of the decomposition is to identify each
component's contribution to overall inequality. Finally, as will be demonstrated in Section 3,
employing the marginal effect approach as single basis for interpreting the decomposition (2)
can lead to confusing results since information about interactions is ignored.
Even though the elasticities do not provide appropriate information for assessing the
contribution of each component to observed overall inequality, they yield important
supplementary information to that obtained by decomposing overall inequality. It is, however,
essential to distinguish between the components' contributions to overall inequality and how
a marginal increase in a single component affects overall inequality. The following three
examples demonstrate the importance of treating the concentration coefficients and the
elasticities as supplementary quantities and not as alternative interpretations of one and the
same quantity.
Table 1. Decomposition of the Gini coefficient with respect to income components. Three
examples based on four income receiving units and two income components
(i)	 G = 0.242
X 6 12 18 23 Sign of
concentr. coeff.
Sign of
elasticity
X I 4 8 12 16 + +
X2 2 4 6 7 + -
G = 0.208
6 10 14 18 Sign of
concentr. coeff.
Sign of
elasticity
X l 4 8 12 16 + +
X2 2 2 2 2 0 -
G = 0.097
X 11 14 16 18 Sign of
concentr. coeff.
_
Sign of
elasticity
X i 4 8 12 16 + +
X2 7 6 4 2 - -
According to Podder (1993) judgements about the contribution of each of the income
components to overall inequality should solely be based on the elasticities of overall
inequality with respect to the specific income components. Thus, Podder suggests that there
is no need to call attention to the altering in sign of the concentration coefficient of a specific
component if the corresponding elasticity does not alter in sign. However, as demonstrated
by Table 1 the concentration coefficients provide essential information about the interaction
between an income component and total income which is ignored by the elasticities. Table
1(i) illustrates a case where X2 interacts positively with total income so that X2 gives a
disequalizing contribution. The reversal of X2 in (iii) demonstrates the case of an equalizing
contribution, whereas the constant X2 in (ii) shows a neutral contribution to inequality.
Now, consider two income components where one (X2) is considerably smaller than
the other (X 1). By introducing an intervention that solely affects X2 we see from Table 2 that
overall inequality has only been slightly affected even though the redistributive structure of
X2, as exhibited by the concentration coefficient, has changed significantly. In many cases this
information may be considered more essential than information about the change in overall
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X	 4.7	 8.7	 12.7	 16.7
X I 	 4	 8	 12	 16
X2	 0.7	 0.7	 0.7	 0.7
Concentration	 Elasticity
coefficient
0.250
	
0.064
0	 -0.064
X	 4.80	 8.75	 12.65	 16.60 Concentration	 Elasticity
coefficient
4	8	 12	 16
X2
	0.80	 0.75	 0.65	 0.60
	0.2 	 0.081
	
-0.063	 -0.081
inequality. For instance, when policy makers are judging the redistributive effects of various
welfare arrangements such as child allowances, they seem to be primarily concerned with the
redistributive structure of each of the welfare arrangements. In Norway the contribution from
child allowances to overall inequality among families with children appears to be
approximately neutral. Thus, in order to improve the redistributive impact of child allowances
it has been proposed to make child allowances liable to taxation. The result of this specific
intervention would roughly correspond to the result displayed by Table 2, i.e. the
concentration coefficient of child allowances is heavily affected even though overall inequality
is only slightly affected. Note that there are only minor changes in the elasticities.
Table 2. Decomposition of the Gini coefficient when the redistributive structure of one
income component (X 2) is altered
Go = 0.234
G i = 0.230
3. The distributional consequences of introducing a new income component
Introducing a new income component, or analogously, removing an income component
from total income, first of all raises the issue of interpreting the behavioral consequences.
Such a new income component could either be a public transfer payment, like a new type of
child allowance or pension benefit, or represent an attempt to expand the statistical income
base towards extended income or full income (Becker 1965). Full income is defined as
potential income from all sources of time use. Extended income is defined as the sum of
disposable income and the imputed value of unpaid household work. But in this case it must
be kept in mind that components of extended income that previously have been disregarded
in the statistical income concept and in the analysis of income distribution, nevertheless are
reflected in economic behavior. If a new transfer payment is introduced, or a previous transfer
payment is removed, the effect on disposable income depends on the labor supply response
and its effect on other income components. Hence, as will be further discussed in Section 5,
evaluating the distributional impact of an income component by comparing, say, the Gini
coefficient with and without the income component requires a specification of the behavioral
context. Secondly, it remains to consider whether it is meaningful to add or remove the
income component in question. A transfer payment and a fringe benefit may be given to or
taken away from the income earners. In both cases the consumption possibilities are affected.
However, this is not the case for e.g. imputed income of own dwelling. This income
component may be increased (or decreased) in order to develop an appropriate income base
for taxation, without changing the underlying consumption possibilities, namely that people
live in their houses irrespective of whether such imputed incomes are added to or removed
from the income basis. Note that we are not discussing how changes in taxation on dwellings
affect the composition of consumption — we are merely pointing to the fact that introducing
or disregarding a certain income imputation scheme does not mean that the source of this
income suddenly appears or vanishes. This point, finally, brings us to the example of
considering the imputed value of household work as an income component. People divide
their time between paid work, unpaid work and leisure, and the goods and services produced
in the household represent an extension of their consumption possibilities irrespective of
whether an imputed value appears in the income base or not. Similarly, these consumption
possibilities do not vanish if one for analytical purposes changes from including to excluding
the value of household work in total income. Moreover, since people do their household work
irrespective of its imputed value, we cannot meaningfully infer any behavioral consequences
of "introducing" or "removing" the value of household work.
From a conceptual perspective we thus have that the value of unpaid household work
already is contained in the underlying income concept, since the consumption possibilities it
represents are present irrespective of definition of income. Thus, it must be kept in mind that
the introduction of such an imputed income cannot be given a behavioral interpretation as in
the context of introducing a "genuinely new" income component. To conclude this discussion,
a more precise formulation of our question of "What is the distributional impact of
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introducing this income component?" would be: "How shall we evaluate the distributional
consequences of including an imputed income that represents consumption possibilities that
were present although their imputed value was disregarded?" As long as we are aware of this
conceptual difference and do not infer any behavioral interpretation by using the term "the
distributional impact of', we find it relevant to examine the distributional consequences of
broadening the measurement of income. To deal with this problem it appears useful to employ
the decomposition method, not least since behavioral implications are avoided.
Let G be the Gini coefficient of disposable income, and O. the Gini coefficient of
extended income. Even though the difference between G and -6 cannot be interpreted as the
contribution to inequality from the new income component, this difference forms the basis
for a comparison of these two decompositions. This approach pays attention to the interactions
between each of the income components and total income (extended income) by taking into
account how these interactions are affected by the introduction of the new income component
and thus how the impact of these interactions on overall inequality is changed.
Without loss of generality consider a situation with two income components X 1 and
X2. According to (2) the decomposition of overall inequality G is given by
G =y + 112
Ti
Now, introducing a new income component X3 with positive mean 113 the decomposition of
the overall inequality O is given by
(5) -	 112	 P3 -
= Yi T,72 77,
where - indicates that the mean (p) of total income and the concentration coefficients ryi and
72 are affected by the introduction of the new income component. Note that ii=p+1.13. The
concentration coefficient 73 measures the interaction between the new income component and
total income. As emphasized above the examination of how the new income component
affects overall inequality should be based on a comparison of the decomposition results with
and without the new income component. Therefore, consider
(4)
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(6) [+ 112 .173- -1! + f3 ?3 .
ii	 It
Equation (6) demonstrates that the introduction of X3 influences overall inequality both via
its own concentration coefficient 73 and via the effect on the concentration coefficients ? I and
?2 of the other income components. The last term in (6) accounts for the own effect which
shows to give a negative contribution to the shift in overall inequality if the new income
component has a negative concentration coefficient 73. However, even if 73 is positive,
introducing X3 may still lead to a reduction in income inequality, provided that the first two
terms of (6) are sufficiently negative to outweigh the positive contribution from ?3 .
Terms one and two in (6) illustrate how the introduction of the new income component
alters the influences of components X 1 and X2 on overall inequality. Inspection of equation
(6) shows that each of these components contributes to an equalizing shift in overall
inequality if
(7) <	 i=1,2,
7 ,
which means that component i contributes to reduce overall inequality if the relative change
in its concentration coefficient is less than the relative change in total income.
To explain this further, note that the introduction of X3 will reduce the income shares
of X 1 and X2, and in general, the interaction between total income and X 1 and X2 will change.
Unless the decline in income shares is outweighted by an increase in the corresponding
concentration coefficients, the contribution to overall inequality from the two original income
components will be reduced. Thus, the introduction of X3 may reduce overall inequality
regardless of the sign of 73. This fact explains why it is important to consider both the new
concentration coefficient and the change in the present concentration coefficients when
evaluating the shift in overall inequality of introducing a new income component.
However, observe that even though the overall effect of a new income component
leads to decreased inequality, a further (marginal) increase in this component may increase
inequality. Such a situation will occur if 73>d.
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Referring to the distinction between contribution to inequality and effect on inequality
we thus conclude that the contribution to inequality from X3 is measured by the last term of
the decomposition of O in (5), and its sign depends on the sign of the concentration
coefficient ?3. In contrast, the distributional consequences from introducing X3 is measured
by (6), and the difference between the decompositions of G and O consists not only of the
contribution to inequality from X3, but also of how X3 affects the interaction between total
income and X 1 and X2. This framework is now illustrated by the following tables.
Table 3. Decomposition of the Gini coefficient G without the new income component
G = 0.208
X 6 12 18 23 Concentration
coefficient
Elasticity
X l 4 8 12 16 0.250 0.168
X2 2 2 2 2 0 -.0.168
Table 4. Decomposition of the Gini coefficient "6. with the new income component
O = 0.138
5: 14 18 20 28 Concentration
coefficient
Elasticity
X i 8 12 4 16 0.100 -0.138
X2 2 2 2 2 0 -0.100
X3 4 4 14 10 0.219 0.238
Tables 3 and 4 give illustrating examples of decomposition of inequality with and without the
new income component. Referring to the discussion above we see that the reduction in
inequality from G to "6 is solely due to the change in the concentration coefficients of X 1 and
X2 since ?3 is positive. However, even though overall inequality is reduced, a further increase
in X3 will increase overall income inequality since #73>6. The simple explanation behind this
result is that the positive interaction between X 1 and total income has been weakened which
means that reranking of X 1 has taken place. The poorest income earner becomes the second
richest in terms of extended income after X3 is introduced. Note that reranking issues have
been considered particularly important in the context of horizontal equity, see e.g. Atkinson
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(1980), Plotnick (1982) and Jenkins (1988). However, as demonstrated by Kakwani (1984),
Lambert (1985), Jenkins (1986) and Aronsen and Lambert (1994), reranking is also an
important issue in analyses of redistributive effects of tax systems, independent of its
relevance to horizontal equity.
As an illustration of how a further increase in X3 will work, assume that X3 is
increased by 50 per cent. The impact of this intervention is demonstrated by Table 5.
Table 5. Decomposition of the Gini-coefficient after a 50 per cent increase of X3
G = 0.151
51( 16 20 27 33 Concentration
coefficient
Elasticity
X 1 8 12 4 16 0.100 -0.141
X2 2 2 2 2 0 -0.083
X3 6 6 21 15 0.219 0.224
Due to the higher income share of X3, the overall inequality increases from 0.138 to 0.151,
even though the introduction of X3 in Table 4 led to a decrease in overall inequality.
A particular aspect of the example displayed by Tables 3 and 4 is the reranking of
income receiving units due to widening total income by including a new income component.
By contrast, consider a case where the introduction of a new income component does not alter
the ranking of units, i.e. the concentration coefficients of X 1 and X2. are not affected by the
introduction of X3 . Hence, t=fy, and 72=y2 which imply that (6) attains the following simple
expression,
(8)
(
- G = - 113 G + 113 ? - 1.13 73 -1
fl	 7 .3 Tt \ G
Note that (8) corresponds to the expression for marginal change in inequality given by (3).
As long as the ranking of income receiving units is unchanged, a comparison of inequality
with and without the new income component yields the same result as considering a marginal
change in income. In this special case the consequences on inequality from introducing a new
income component can be analyzed as a marginal effect on inequality. Equation (8) shows
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that the effect via X 1 and X2 when X3 is included is always negative since it mounts to a
reduction in the income shares of X 1 and X2 and thus to a decline in their contributions to
inequality. In other words the effect via X 1 and X2 may decrease overall inequality even if
the concentration coefficient 1■3 is positive, provided that ?3 is less than G. An example
illustrating this case is given by comparing Tables 3 and 6.
Table 6. Decomposition of the Gini coefficient O with the new income component
O = 0.179
i"t 10 15 20 25 Concentration
coefficient
Elasticity
X l 4 8 12 16 0.250 0.226
X2 2 2 2 2 0 -0.112
X3 4 5 6 7 0.114 - 0.114
Since the concentration coefficient ?3 is lower than inequality without X3 (G=0.208), O attains
an even lower value. Note that ?3<6 so that a further increase in X3 will reduce overall
inequality.
Table 7 illustrates an example where the new income component shows a negative
interaction with total income, so that the effect via '73 contributes to the observed reduction
in overall inequality.
Table 7. Decomposition of the Gini coefficient with the new income component
= 0.129
10 13 16 19 Concentration
coefficient
Elasticity
X l 4 8 12 16 0.250 0.647
X2 2 2 2 2 0 -0.138
X3 4 3 2 1 -0.250 -0.509
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4. The value of unpaid household work results based on Norwegian data
We will now apply the framwork of comparing the decompositions of inequality with
and without the new income component to actual data for the value of unpaid household
work. With this approach we are able to measure how the introduction of a new income
component influences the interactions between all income components and total income. This
provides a new interpretation as compared to the traditional method of only comparing the
levels of inequality with and without the new income component, see e.g. Bonke (1992) and
Bryant and Zick (1985).
The value assessment of unpaid household work is based on data from the Norwegian
Time Budget Survey 1990 (see Aslaksen and Koren (1993)). A number of valuation criteria
have been applied in the literature, including direct valuation of goods and services bought
to replace home produced goods and services, and indirect valuation of time used for unpaid
work. Indirect valuation is based on wage rates for paid help in the home, either specialized
help or general housekeeping, or on opportunity cost, i.e. one's own foregone wage rate. In
line with recent national account estimates of unpaid household work in Norway we have
used the wage rate for municipal home helper as the valuation criterion.
Table 8 gives the decomposition of the Gini coefficients of the distribution of
disposable income with and without the value of unpaid household work.
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Table 8. Decomposition of the Gini coefficients of the distribution of disposable income with
respect to income before tax and tax and with respect to income before tax, tax and
value of household work, for couples with children. 1990
Gini	 Income	 Inequality	 Income	 Concentration Elasticity
coeff.	 component	 share	 share	 coefficient
Income before tax
G = 0.222	 (X 1 )	 1.498	 1.380	 0.241	 0.118
Tax (X2)	 -0.498	 -0.380	 0.291	 -0.118
Income before tax
(X 1 )	 0.869	 0.597	 0.175	 0.272
= 0.120 Tax (X2)	 -0.286	 -0.164	 0.208	 -0.122
Value of
household work
(X3)	 0.417	 0.568	 0.088	 -0.151
Table 8 shows that the concentration coefficients and income shares of income before tax and
tax are substantially changed when unpaid household work is introduced. We see that the
concentration coefficients are reduced from y1=0.241 to tifi=0.175, and from y2=0.291 to
?2=0.208. Due to the high income share of X3 the income share of X 1 is reduced from 1.380
to 0.597 and the income share of X2 is reduced in absolute terms from 0.380 to 0.164. We
find that inequality is reduced when X3 is introduced although the concentration coefficient
of X3 is positive, ?3=0.088. We have that the difference O-G = -0.102 consists of an effect
via X 1 and X2 of -0.152 and an effect via X3 of 0.050. This means that 150 per cent of the
reduction in the Gini coefficient is explained by the changes in the concentration coefficients
of X 1 and X2. This effect, which is due to reranking of X 1 and X2 as well as to the high
income share of X3, thus explains why the Gini coefficient is reduced when X3 is introduced
even though the interaction coefficient of X3 is positive. We have that ?3<6 which means
that a further marginal increase in X3 will lead to a further reduction in inequality.
The value of household work amounts to 57 per cent of total income (extended
income) and contributes to 42 per cent of inequality in extended income. This means that the
inequality contribution is relatively smaller for household work than for the other income
components. Household work has, compared to income before tax, a more favourable ranking
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in terms of a less disequalizing effect on extended income.
Note that the distribution of the value of unpaid household work reflects the
distribution of time allocated to household tasks, since time is valued equally for all units. An
alternative approach is to use individual wage rates. If those with high incomes also spend
much time in unpaid home activities, the actual distribution of the value of household work
would be more unequal than our estimates indicate.
To conclude, our analysis shows that a mere inspection of the sign of the concentration
coefficient does not give sufficient information about the effect on inequality from introducing
a new income component. The value of unpaid household work has a positive concentration
coefficient, ?3
 = 0.088, and hence a positive contribution to inequality. Yet we find that
overall inequality declines when this income component is introduced, due to substantial
weaker interaction between extended income and the other income components. This shows
that the effect on inequality may be negative even if the contribution to inequality is positive
and illustrates the importance of analyzing the decompositions with and without the new
income component.
5. The overall distributive effect from different income components
To conclude the discussion of behavioral issues in Section 2 we now attempt to clarify
the notion of overall distributive effect. A major issue in inequality analysis concerns the
problem of assessing the distributive effects from different income components that add up
to total income. In most applications this issue is approached by considering marginal changes
of the income component in question. However, it seems intuitively appealing to define the
overall distributive effect of a specific income component as the change in inequality that
would follow — hypothetically or actually — from removing this income component from
total income. Removing or introducing an income component due to changes in government
policy has, however, behavioral consequences for the other income components. To be
meaningful, the definition of overall distributive effect requires that the change in overall
inequality captures both indirect (behavioral) effects and direct effects.
In official analyses of tax and benefit reforms the standard approach ignores the effects
of behavioral responses. Due to this practice it is crucial for the interpretation of the analyses
to clarify whether the intervention is hypothetical or actual. An example of a hypothetical
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intervention in the income distribution would be to "remove" income taxes in order to assess
the overall distributive effect of the income tax system by comparing the situation with and
without income taxes. In contrast, an actual intervention in the income distribution
corresponds to any given change in the actual tax/transfer system, such as a marginal change
in a tax rate, or a tax reform, or eliminating or introducing new items of the tax/transfer
system.
An actual intervention in the income distribution, with observed data from before and
after the intervention, gives us an observational context where data reflect behavior both
before and after the intervention. Thus, both indirect and direct effects can be assessed
without relying on behavioral equations. In this situation the following notation is used. Let
F 1 and F2 be the distributions of income when a certain policy means is absent and present,
respectively, and let I(Fi) be the inequality in the distribution Fi, i=1,2, measured by some
inequality measure I. Then the overall distributive effect on income inequality due to the
policy means is given by
(a) Overall distributive effect = 1(F2) - I(F 1 ),
whether it is considered as an introduction or a removal of a policy means. As indicated
above the overall effect may be decomposed into a direct and an indirect effect. However,
since we may consider the intervention as either introduction or removal of a policy means
the definition of the direct and indirect effects depends on whether we consider F 1 or F2 as
a benchmark and point of departure. In most cases it appears, however, sensible to consider
F 1
 as the reference case and examine how F 1 is affected by the policy proposal. Let P2 be the
hypothetical income distribution that captures the direct effect given unchanged behavior.
Then it follows that the direct effect can be defined by
(b) Direct effect = I(P2) - I(F1).
Note that the definition (b) turns out to be in accordance with the conventional application
and interpretation of tax/benefit models. From (a) and (b) it follows that the indirect effect
is given by
(c) Indirect effect = I(F2) - I(P2).
Now, let us consider a situation where a tax reform has been carried out, i.e. both F 1 and F2
have been observed and (a), (b) and (c) can be assessed. Note, however, that the overall effect
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from taxes may be interpreted as either the effect from introducing taxes or the effect from
removing taxes. The latter case considers F2 as a benchmark and suggests the following
alternative definition of the direct and indirect effects,
(b*) Direct effect = I(F2) - 1(P ),
where P 1
 represents the hypothetical income distribution that captures the direct effect from
removing taxes given unchanged behavior. From (a) and (b*) it follows that the indirect effect
in this case is given by
(c*) Indirect effect = I(P 1) - I(F 1 ).
Since (b) and (b*) in most cases will take different values it is particularly important
to clarify whether the intervention deals with the introduction or removal of a policy means.
This problem occurs when we consider the impact of including a "new" income component
into the statistical base for total income. The new income component may originate from an
actual policy intervention, such as the introduction of a new public transfer payment. In this
case the overall distributive effect may be decomposed either way. Alternatively, as in our
context of household work, the "new" income component may represent an attempt to expand
the income basis. By reviewing the preceding discussion we may conclude that neither F 1 nor
P i exist in the case of household work, so that neither (b) nor (b*) are meaningful
representations of the behavioral effects. This illustrates the importance of distinguishing
between a theoretical and an empirical broadening of the income concept.
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